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PROPERTY RIGHTS AFTER DOLAN: THE SEARCH FOR THE
MADISONIAN SOLUTION TO THE REGULATORY TAKINGS
CONUNDRUM
JEREMY WALKER*
Yesterday the active area in this field was concerned with
"property." Today it is "civil liberties." Tomorrow it may again
be "property." Who can say that in a society with a mixed
economy, like ours, these two areas are sharply separated, and
that certain freedoms in relation to property may not again be
deemed, as they were in the past, aspects of individualfreedom?'
The "Takings Clause" of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution loudly proclaims that private property shall not "be taken for public
use, without just compensation."2 In 1922, Justice Holmes relied on this clause in
declaring that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."3 With Holmes' famous dicta as its
launch pad, the Supreme Court embarked on its long and meandering journey into
the dense forest of regulatory takings jurisprudence.4 In its recent decision in Dolan
v. City of Tigard' the Court followed the path beaten by James Madison and has
emerged from the forest toting a sensible approach to solving the regulatory takings
conundrum.
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause is clear in certain respects. If the
government utilizes its power of eminent domain and condemns private property,
it must adequately compensate the landowner.6 Furthermore, if the government
* Mr. Walker received his B.S. in Civil Engineering from the University of Notre Dame in 1990 and
expects to receive his J.D. from the William and Mary School of Law at the College of William and
Mary in May of 1996.
1 FELIX FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 19 (Philip Elman ed., 1956).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the framers intended the Fifth Amendment to fetter only the
federal government, the Supreme Court has held that the Takings Clause and just compensation
requirement of the Fifth Amendment apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process requirements. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41
(1897).
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
When a government regulates private property in a manner that restricts the property rights of a
landowner, the government has in a sense "taken" property without physically seizing any land. See
infra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1946); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S.
367, 372-73 (1875). The Constitution does not contain a specific provision specifying the power of
eminent domain. The Supreme Court, however, has asserted that the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause "is a tacit recognition of a preexisting power to take private property for public use." Carmack,
329 U.S. at 241.
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undertakes action that results in a permanent physical invasion of privately owned
property, then the government must likewise compensate the landowner.'
What is not so clear, however, is how courts should adjudicate when a
government does not physically invade one's property, but regulates the property
in such a way as to deprive the owner of a particular use of the property.8 Local
governments have proscribed landowners from developing their land as a result of
zoning regulations,9 have prohibited coal production companies from mining their
coal because the mining activities may lead to subsidence problems of the surface
structures, 0 and have prohibited property owners from enlarging their buildings
because the buildings are historic landmarks." When do these actions trigger the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and require the government to provide just
compensation to the landowner? This is the regulatory takings dilemma, and the
Supreme Court has previously voiced its frustration in not being able to devise any
concrete judicial standards to resolve this issue. 2
Deeply entrenched in the morass of regulatory takings jurisprudence is the
authority of local governments to impose developmental exactions as the City of
Tigard attempted to do in Dolan.3 Developmental exactions are a form of land-use
regulation that arise when a property owner petitions a local government for a
permit to develop his or her land, and the local government conditions the grant of
the permit upon the property owner giving up something in return." The recent
In Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871), the Court held that the government's
construction of a dam that resulted in permanent flooding of a landowner's property constituted a
taking requiring compensation. Id. at 181. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), the
Court held that a federal navigational servitude did not apply to the landowner's pond and that if the
government required public access, it would have to compensate the landowner. Id. at 179-80. The
Court has made it clear that a taking occurs regardless of the magnitude of the physical invasion. For
example, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the Court ruled
that cable boxes consisting of only one cubic foot attached to a building still resulted in a permanent
physical invasion and that therefore just compensation was required. Id. at 438-40.
1 The Supreme Court has long recognized that the term "property" in the Fifth Amendment does not
refer only to the physical aspect of an item such as land. Rather, the Court considers "property" to
stand for "the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to
possess, use and dispose of it." United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
9 See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-95 (1926).
10 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 133-37 (1978).
12 Justice Stevens stated: "[Tihe Court has repeatedly recognized that it itself cannot establish any
objective rules to assess when a regulation becomes a taking." First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 340 n.17 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens continued, claiming that the Court's regulatory takings cases are "open-ended and
standardless." Id. See also William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 1057, 1059 n. I1 (1980) (referring to takings jurisprudence as "disheveled as a
ragpicker's coat").
'* 114 S. Ct. at 2312. For a discussion of Dolan, see infra text accompanying notes 57-88.
*4 For a thorough discussion of developmental exactions, see Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier,
Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American Practices, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 51 (1987).
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upsurge in local governments' use of developmental exactions 5 has forced the
Supreme Court to grapple with a new breed of cases that implicate the clouded
regulatory takings doctrine.
6
Property rights advocates hail the Dolan decision as the appropriate
progression in a line of cases since 1986 in which the Supreme Court has applied
a heightened form of scrutiny to land-use regulations. 7 Such heightened scrutiny,
according to these advocates, is necessary to protect landowners in the face of an
increasing barrage of environmental regulations. 8 Many in Congress, as well as in
various state legislatures, are attempting to carry the property rights movement
further by proposing bills that would make it more difficult for government
agencies to enact land-use regulations without compensating affected landowners. 9
However, others decry Dolan, asserting that the Court should not inhibit the efforts
of local governments to enact ratiinal land-use regulations, even if the regulations
limit the rights of individual property owners.20
After providing an analysis of contemporary regulatory takings
jurisprudence, this Note will suggest that the Supreme Court's holding in Dolan
clearly reflects the degree of property rights that James Madison envisioned when
drafting the Fifth Amendment. In making this argument, this Note will examine
and refute the suggestion that the Supreme Court's heightened means-end scrutiny
espoused in Dolan will substantially limit the ability of local governments to enact
necessary land-use regulations. Rather, Dolan allows governmental bodies to enact
land-use regulations but properly forces governments to be more careful and
efficient in enacting regulations which affect the rights of private property owners.
Next, this Note will submit that, although the Supreme Court has taken
steps to ensure that property owners receive the rights guaranteed them by the Fifth
Amendment, takings jurisprudence in the United States is still muddled. This Note
then will survey various legislative attempts to strengthen property rights in the
regulatory takings arena and discuss why these attempts do not provide a
satisfactory solution to the problem. Finally, this Note will suggest measures which
state courts could implement that would allow governmental bodies to enact
'1 As local governments face increasing financial difficulties, they are turning to private owners and
transferring the costs of various items such as sidewalks, roads, sewer lines, and even greenways to
them. See Susan M. Denbo, Development Exactions: A New Way to Fund State and Local
Government Infrastructure Improvements and Affordable Housing, 23 REAL EST. L.J. 7, 7 (1994).
16 See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). For a discussion of Nollan,
see infra text accompanying notes 47-55.
" See infra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Michael M. Berger, Property Owners Have Rights, Too, L.A. TIMEs, July 3, 1994, at M5
(claiming that "[liocal governments and environmental activists have gotten used to treating property
owners who need permits as convenient fish in a barrel").
"' See infra notes 186-97 and accompanying text.
20 A spokesman for the Audubon Society claimed that the Dolan decision "is an extraordinary
intrusion by the court into the authority of local government" which "elevates the interests of property
owners over the interests of the community as a whole." Berger, supra note 18, at M5.
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necessary land-use regulations, while providing landowners with the rights
guaranteed them by the Constitution.
1. CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
[T]his Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any "set formula" for
determining when 'justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government. ...
When governmental entities want to restrict the rights of a private property
owner without resorting to eminent domain, they often will attempt to regulate the
land in the desired manner without actually condemning or physically invading the
land. Without providing any compensation to the property owner, local
governments have been able to limit development of property,22 require developers
to grant public easements, 3 and force landowners to give up their mining rights. 24
Frequently local governments accomplish these goals without resorting to eminent
domain by relying on the valid use of their "police powers" to impose land-use
regulations.2 5
Although the Constitution does not explicitly grant police powers to federal
or state governments, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that a
government inherently has the general power to act to protect the health, safety, and
welfare of the people.26 The notion of police powers has its origins in such thinkers
as John Locke and Thomas Jefferson, who believed that citizens grant police
powers to their government so that it can maintain a peaceful and just society.27
The extent of the role of police power in the regulatory takings arena has
evoked considerable controversy. Such controversy is illustrated best by the
opposing views of Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis in the seminal case of
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.2" In that case, a landowner purchased a home
with a chain of title which reserved to a coal company the right to extract coal from
21 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
22 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-63 (1980).
23 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 170-80.
24 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-93 (1987).
2' For a thorough discussion of police powers and their importance in takings jurisprudence, see
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 107-45
(1985).
26 See id. at 107-09. The Supreme Court also attempted to define police powers as such. In Lochner
v. New York, the Court stated that there are "certain powers, existing in the sovereignty of each state
in the Union, somewhat vaguely termed police powers .... Those powers ... relate to the safety,
health, morals, and general welfare of the public." 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
27 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 16-30, 59-60 (1992); James L.
Oakes, 'Property Rights'in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583, 584-90 (1980).
28 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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beneath the surface of the property.29 Subsequently, Pennsylvania enacted a statute
that prohibited the mining of coal located beneath a house because of the possibility
of subsidence."a Because the regulation would have precluded the coal company
from mining the coal to which it had purchased a right, the Court ruled that the
regulation constituted a taking.31 Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes asserted:
When this seemingly absolute protection is found to be qualified
by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to
extend the qualification more and more until at last private
property disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way
under the Constitution of the United States. The general rule at
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.32
Justice Brandeis, in dissent, rebutted:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise
of the police power deprives the owner of some right theretofore
enjoyed, and is ...an abridgement by the state of rights in
property without making compensation. But restriction imposed
to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers
threatened is not a taking.3
Ever since these justices voiced their opinions, this fundamental argument has been
continually debated.34 One school of thought in line with Justice Brandeis' position
espouses the view that any regulation that is a valid exercise of a government's
police power cannot constitute a taking.35 Therefore, if a government regulates
29 Id. at 412.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 416.
32 Id. at415.
13 Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
14 See MARK POLLOT, GRAND THEFT AND PETIT LARCENY 74-83 (1993).
15 In earlier cases, the Supreme Court espoused the "noxious use" principle. Under this principle,
governments could regulate private land use without providing compensation to the landowner if
necessary to prevent harm to the public. For a thorough discussion of the noxious use theory, see
EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 160-84. See also Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (allowing
government to forbid continued operation of quarry due to dangers to residences in area); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (permitting government to forbid manufacture of alcoholic beverages
because of health related dangers).
In later cases, however, the Court relied simply on the government's broad police powers
to uphold land-use regulations necessary to protect the general public. In Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, the Court explicitly rejected the noxious use principle, declaring that whether a land-
use regulation requires compensation to the affected landowner is not contingent upon a regulation
being labeled as "harm-preventing" rather than "benefit-conferring." 505 U.S. 1003, 1023 (1992).
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someone's property in an effort to protect the health, safety, or welfare of the
citizenry, a court logically could not find a taking or demand that the property
owner be compensated. The alternative view, in line with Justice Holmes' position,
recognizes that, although a regulation may be a valid exercise of police power, the
regulation may infringe the constitutionally-protected property rights of an
individual and require just compensation.36
Since Mahon, the Supreme Court has vacillated from one extreme to the
other but in time has sided with Holmes, recognizing that even valid exercises of
police power can constitute takings." Prior to the 1980s, the Court had failed to
delineate a clear-cut standard and instead had relied on ad hoc solutions to
individual cases. In the 1980 decision of Agins v. City of Tiburon,39 the Supreme
Court overruled a California Supreme Court decision and held that a local
government could not, in an effort to keep an attractive hilltop area free of
development, zone the area such that development on private property had to be
kept to a bare minimum.4" Opining that the ordinance deprived the landowners of
practically all economic use of their land, the Supreme Court held that a land-use
regulation constitutes a taking unless the regulation "substantially advance[s]
legitimate state interests"'" and does not deprive an owner of all "economically
viable use of his land."42 The Court affirmed this holding in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council in 1992. 43 In Lucas, the South Carolina Coastal Council,
in accordance with a newly enacted regulation, prohibited an owner of beachfront
property from building a single-family home on his land because it was located on
a section of beach vulnerable to erosion." The Supreme Court ruled that the
regulation, which was enacted after Lucas purchased his property, denied Lucas
substantially all economically viable use of his land.45 Therefore, he was entitled
to just compensation.46
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that courts of the past used the noxious use principle to
justify government regulations that "we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with respect to the full
scope of the State's police power." Id. For a full discussion of Lucas, see supra text accompanying
notes 43-46.
36 See EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 107-10.
31 See Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, "'Take' My Beach Please!": Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis of Development Exactions, 69 B.U. L. REv.
823, 833-40 (1989).
3' For a discussion outlining the various tests the court employed, see John A. Humbach, Economic
Due Process and the Takings Clause, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 311, 314-18 (1987).
39 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
40 Id. at 262-63.
41 Id. at 260.
42 Id.
43 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
44 Id. at 1007.
45 Id. at 1031.
46 Id.
268 [Vol. 20:263
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In the 1987 case Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,"7 the Court
added to the Agins standard by requiring that there must exist an "essential nexus"
between the regulation chosen by the government to advance legitimate state
interests and the interests themselves.48 If there was no such essential nexus, the
regulation would constitute a taking and require compensation to the adversely
affected property owner.49 In Nollan, petitioners wanted to rebuild the home that
was located on beachfront property." The local land governance board prevented
petitioners from rebuilding, unless they agreed to grant a public easement traversing
the sandy beach which stretched from their home to the ocean.5 The governing
board claimed that a larger home would obstruct the view of the ocean from those
driving by the property and would also increase the use of public beaches, which
in turn would cause a greater need for pedestrian access to the sandy strip of beach
in front of petitioners' home.52
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, explained that the demanded
easement lacked the essential nexus to the ramifications that would result from the
proposed rebuilding.53 He asserted that the easement could not in any way enhance
the view of people driving by, nor would the rebuilding cause increased pedestrian
traffic on the beaches such that an easement was required to relieve congestion from
pedestrians trying to get from one end of the beach to the other.5 4 The Court held
that "the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out
plan of extortion."' 55 Until the Court handed down its opinion in Dolan, the Court
did not add further to these regulatory takings standards.
II. DOLAN V. CITY OF TIGARD
[PIroperty owners have surely found a new friend today.56
Florence Dolan owned and managed a plumbing and electric supply retail
store in the main business district of Tigard, Oregon.57 The store itself covered
9,700 square feet of her 1.67-acre parcel of land, with a portion of the land in a
floodplain bordering a creek.5" In 1988, Dolan applied to the city for a permit to
47 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
41 Id. at 837.
49 Id.
1o Id. at 827.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 828-29.
13 Id. at 838-41.
54 Id.
SS Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981)). For a complete
analysis of Nollan, see Morosoff, supra note 37, at 825-30, 870-74.
56 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 438 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
58 Id.
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raze the existing structure and build a new store which would be approximately
twice the size of the original store. 9 In addition, Dolan planned to construct
another building for some smaller businesses, as well as a larger parking area. 6' All
of the proposed plans fit within Tigard's zoning scheme, and the city granted
Dolan's permit.61 The grant, however, was conditioned upon Dolan's dedicating the
portion of her property lying within the floodplain as a greenway to improve
drainage. 62 The city also demanded that Dolan dedicate an additional fifteen-foot
strip of land for conversion into a pedestrian/bicycle pathway.63 Dolan sought a
variance from the exactions, which the city denied.' The Oregon Land Use Board
of Appeals, 65 the Oregon Court of Appeals,66 and the Oregon Supreme Court 67 all
sustained the city's denial of a variance, holding that the city's imposed exactions
did not constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment or the corresponding clause
in the Oregon Constitution.6 All three bodies interpreted the Nollan standard to
require a "reasonable relationship" between Dolan's proposed development and the
city's exaction requirements.69 The United States Supreme Court, however,
disagreed with the Oregon courts' interpretation and reversed, holding that Tigard's
developmental exactions constituted a taking.70
In a majority opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court first examined whether the city's purported interests were proper and agreed
with the city that the goals of the exactions were legitimate.7' Because Dolan's
parcel of land was located within a floodplain, any further development would lead
to increased precipitation run-off, and the prevention of flooding was a legitimate
state interest. 72 Likewise, with respect to the pathway, the city's goal of reducing
traffic congestion which could result from increased development was also a valid
state interest. 73
Next, the Court inquired into whether the city's demanded exactions met
59 Id.
60 Id.




65 Dolan v. City of Tigard, LUBA 91-161 (1992), aJftd, 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), aff'd, 854
P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
' Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), affd, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), rev'd
114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
67 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), rev'd 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
68 Dolan, 854 P.2d at 444; Dolan, 832 P.2d at 856. The Oregon Constitution mandates that "[p]rivate
property shall not be taken for public use, nor the particular services of any man be demanded, without
just compensation." OR. CONST. art. I, § 18.
69 See Dolan, 854 P.2d at 441-44; Dolan, 832 P.2d at 854-56.
'0 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2309.
7' Id. at 2317-18.
72 Id. at 2318.
73 Id.
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the "essential nexus" test mandated by Nollan.74 Both the greenway and the
bicycle/pedestrian pathway met the "essential nexus" test as both were effective
ways of dealing with the problems which the city suggested would result from
Dolan's increasing the size of her supply store.75
The Court then proceeded to perform an additional analytical step not
appearing in Nollan. It was in this step that the Court enumerated greater protection
for property owners. In Nollan, the Court ended its analysis when it determined
that there was not even a loose nexus between the anticipated ramifications of the
proposed development and the government's demanded exactions.76 After finding
that an essential nexus existed in Dolan, the Court further asserted, "[W]e must then
decide the required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected
impact of the proposed development."" In other words, the exaction must be
related not only in nature to the proposed development, but it must also be related
in extent.78
In determining how to articulate the necessary extent of connection, the
Court resorted to surveying the various standards employed by state courts. 79 The
Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires that there be a "rough
proportionality" between the exaction and the anticipated ramifications of the
proposed development."0 The Court qualified the standard by asserting that no
"precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development."'" A significant component
of the Court's new standard is the city's burden of showing that the required degree
of connection, rough proportionality, is met. 2 Finally, the Court held that Tigard
did not meet the newly articulated rough proportionality standard. 3 Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed that the city had failed to demonstrate that Dolan's surrendering
of approximately ten percent of her property for a public greenway was roughly
74 Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
71 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318.
76 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837-42.
77 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
78 Id. at 2319-20.
79 The Court identified generally three different standards which exist among the various states courts.
The Court asserted that the states with very generalized statements as to the necessary connection
between the required exaction and the impact of the proposed development are too lax and are
constitutionally insufficient. Id. at 2318-19. The Court then declared that the standard at the other
extreme, which is termed the "specific and uniquely attributable test" and demands direct
proportionality, is excessive. Id. at 2319. The Court settled on an intermediate standard which the
Court labeled as "rough proportionality." Id. at 2319-20.
80 Id.
I1 d.
82 Id. at 2320 n.8.
81 Id. at 2321-22.
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proportional to increased flood prevention needs. 4 Likewise, the city's findings
that the bicycle/pedestrian pathway "could" offset some of the traffic problems did
not demonstrate sufficient basis for the demand of the pathway.8"
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, assailed the majority's decision to
place the burden on the city, arguing that there was no precedent for this
requirement.8 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist responded to Justice Stevens' attack by
distinguishing zoning regulations, in which the burden is not placed upon the local
government, and exactions, in which the burden must be placed upon the local
government because it makes decisions specifying conditions necessary for
property owners to develop their land. 7
Dolan mandates that an exaction regulation constitutes a taking unless: (1)
there is an essential nexus between the regulation chosen by the government to
advance legitimate state interests and the interests themselves, (2) the government
demonstrates a rough proportionality between the exaction and the anticipated
ramifications of the proposed development, and (3) the regulation does not deprive
the property owner of economically viable use of his land. 8
III. THE REVIVAL OF MADISONIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS
In civilized communities, property as well as personal rights is an essential object
of the laws .... In a just & a free, Government, therefore, the rights both of
property & ofpersons ought to be effectually guarded 9
In no other country in the world is the love of property keener or more alert than
in the United States, and nowhere else does the majority display less inclination
toward doctrines which in any way threaten the way property is owned 9'
A. Madisonian Property Rights
A discussion of regulatory takings jurisprudence cannot be confined to
contemporary cases but also must focus on the thoughts of the Framers and the
property rights they envisioned in designing the Constitution. James Madison
84 Rehnquist asserted that "[i]t is difficult to see why recreational visitors trampling along petitioner's
floodplain easement are sufficiently related to the city's legitimate interest in reducing flooding
problems." Id. at 2320.
11 Id. at 2321-22.
86 Id. at 2323 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 2320 n.8.
" See supra notes 39-80 and accompanying text.
89 James Madison, Speech of Aug. 7, 1787, reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE
POLITCAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 395 (Marvin Meyers ed., Brandeis Univ. Press 1981) (1973)
[hereinafter THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER].
90 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 638-39 (Jacob P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds.,
Ist ed. 1966) (1961).
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drafted the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution,9' and, hence, any standard
underlying the takings issue should generally conform to Madison's design.
Madison's belief in property rights stemmed from those principles espoused
by English thinkers such as William Blackstone and John Locke. Blackstone's
legal philosophies permeated early American law,92 and Madison adhered to
Blackstone's notion of property. In his essay Property, Madison quoted Blackstone
when claiming that property "means 'that dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every other
individual."' 93 Blackstone proclaimed that property rights emanated from natural
law, and thus the absolute rights of property could not be infringed, "not even for
the general good of the whole community." '94
The thinking of John Locke reflected a similar natural law belief in the
individual's right to property. Locke asserted that the "supreme power cannot take
from any man any part of his property without his own consent."'95 According to
these ideologies, property rights are absolute and should receive at least as much
respect as other individuals' rights.96
Madison recognized the importance of an individuals' right to property and
drafted the Fifth Amendment to ensure that these rights were protected from the
broad powers of government. During the revolutionary era, the prevailing political
ideology was republicanism, with Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin acting
as its leading proponents.97 Republicans held dear the belief that citizens sacrificed
their individual interests for the common good of the nation.98 Consequently,
legislatures had virtually free reign to impose on an individual's property rights if
the imposition was necessary for the common good.99 It was exactly this free reign
against which Madison intended the Fifth Amendment to protect. Madison did not
trust the legislature to protect adequately individual rights and was wary that the
republican ideology would validate the uncompensated taking of an individual's
property. 00
Although Madison believed that property rights were fundamental, he also
recognized that, in order for the government to rule effectively, it must have the
9" See ELY, supra note 27, at 53.
92 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 112 (2d ed. 1985); ELY, supra note
27, at 32.
9 James Madison, Property, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert Rutland et
al. eds., 1983) [hereinafter Property].
9' WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 135.
91 JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, SECOND ESSAY 85 (Henry Regnery ed., 1948).
96 See Oakes, supra note 27, at 583.
" See William M. Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 694-701 (1985).
91 Id. at 699.
99 Judge Oakes labels the Republican beliefs as the "Social View" of property and contrasts them with
the principles of Madison's "Dominion View." Oakes, supra note 27, at 584-87.
100 See Treanor, supra note 97, at 706-10.
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power of eminent domain."' Madison specifically intended the Fifth Amendment
to be a judicial check on the government's right to invoke its powers of eminent
domain.' 2 Madison's writings reflect not only his belief that property could not be
"directly" taken without compensation but also his recognition of the dangers of
government infringing on property rights without formally condemning private
property.0 3 Madison proclaimed that a government "which indirectly violates [the
people's] property, in their actual possessions ... is not a pattern for the UnitedStates. ' 04
B. Recognition of Fundamental Property Rights in Reviewing Land-Use
Regulations
The Supreme Court's recent willingness to extend heightened scrutiny to
land-use regulations in cases such as Nollan and, most recently, in Dolan, has
generated significant controversy. Many commentators have argued that an
individual's property rights are not fundamental and that courts should not afford
them the same protection as established fundamental rights, such as the right to free
speech. 5 In fact, Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Dolan argued that the
level of scrutiny applied should not "approximate the kind of review that would
apply if the city had insisted on a surrender of Dolan's First Amendment rights in
exchange for a building permit."'"
The Supreme Court's heightened scrutiny in Nollan and Dolan certainly
reflects Madison's view that courts must carefully examine any legislative attempt
to violate an individual's fundamental property rights. Accordingly, in Dolan Chief
Justice Rehnquist denounced claims that the Court should not provide the same
protection to property rights as it does to other fundamental rights, declaring:
"[W]e see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a
part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be
relegated to the status of a poor relation in these comparable circumstances."'" 7
Indeed, this argument is exactly in accordance with Madison's intentions. Madison
101 See POLLOT, supra note 34, at 43-46.
102 See James Madison, Speech Proposing the Bill of Rights (June 8, 1789), [hereinafter Speech
Proposing] in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 207 (Charles F. Hodson et al. eds., 1979) (asserting
that "independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves ... guardians of those rights").
103 See ELY, supra note 27, at 55-56.
04 Property, supra note 93, at 267-68 (emphasis omitted).
loS See, e.g., Kenneth Berlin, Just Compensation Doctrine and the Workings of Government: The
Threat From the Supreme Court and Possible Response, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 93, 94-96 (1993);
J. Freitag, Note, Takings 1992: Scalia's Jurisprudence and a Fifth Amendment Doctrine to Avoid
Lochner Redivivus, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 743, 745 (1994).
106 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2328-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Freitag, supra note 105, at 745
(suggesting that regulations targeting property use should receive more deferential review than
regulations protecting "fundamental constitutional rights").
1"7 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
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proclaimed that he considered the Fifth Amendment to be of "equal if not greater
importance than" the others.'"8
Ever since the emergence of the New Deal programs in the 1930s, the status
of property rights has never been afforded the same level of protection as other
fundamental rights such as the right to free speech and the right to free exercise of
religion. °" However, various Supreme Court justices and other prominent judges
have not always agreed with the lesser judicial protection granted to property rights.
In 1958, Learned Hand noted that "it would have seemed a strange anomaly" to the
drafters of the Fifth Amendment "to learn that [the drafters] constituted severer
restrictions as to Liberty than Property."" In 1972, Justice Potter Stewart speaking
for the Court argued that "the dichotomy between personal liberties and property
rights is a false one.... That rights in property are basic civil rights has long been
recognized.""' The Court's insistence in Dolan that property rights are
fundamental rights signals a welcome restoration of the property rights envisioned
by Madison.' 1' 2
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Dolan, criticized the Court for
focusing particularly on the fact that the imposed exactions would deprive Dolan
of the ability to exclude others." 3 Stevens argued that the right to exclude is only
one "strand" in the bundle of property rights and that the destruction of a single
right does not constitute a taking." 4 This reasoning is not unprecedented in
Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City,"' the Supreme Court upheld a regulation prohibiting the owners of
Grand Central Terminal from building modem business offices atop the terminal." 6
The Court ruled that the regulation was a valid method of preserving a historic
landmark." 7 The owners of the terminal complained that the regulation prohibited
them from utilizing one portion of their property, namely the airspace above the
0I Speech Proposing, supra note 102, at 208. In a personal letter, Madison emphasized that there are
"two cardinal objects of Government; the rights of persons, and the rights of property." James
Madison, Remarks on Mr. Jefferson's Draught of a Constitution (October 15, 1788), reprinted in THE
MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra note 89, at 36.
'09 See DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCIETY THROUGH
LAND USE REGULATION 15-16 (1993). See also Oakes, supra note 27, at 608 (asserting that "property
rights were essentially confined to a legal dust bin").
110 LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 50-51 (1958).
... Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). In making these arguments, Justice
Stewart cited works of John Locke and William Blackstone. Id.
... See supra notes 91-104 and accompanying text.
.. Justice Stevens stated: "Although limitation of the right to exclude others undoubtedly constitutes
a significant infringement upon property ownership . . .restrictions on that right do not alone
constitute a taking." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2324-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
114 Id. at 2324 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"t 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
6 Id. at 138.
I' ld. at 109.
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terminal."' Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, dismissed this argument and
asserted:
'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a
particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a
whole." 9
This stance unquestionably forsakes the original meaning of the Takings
Clause by downplaying the significance of the right to exclude others. Madison
himself emphasized the extreme importance of this right. 20 Madison's sentiment
is echoed in a 1979 case in which the Court found a taking when the government
imposed a navigational servitude requiring public access to a private landowner's
pond.'2 ' The Court emphasized that the right to exclude others is "one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property
[rights]."1
C. The Return of Lochnerism?
Some opponents decry the Supreme Court's use of heightened scrutiny in
takings jurisprudence as nothing more than a revival of the application of
substantive due process to economic regulations, ajudicial concept which the Court
abandoned fifty years ago.12 Throughout a forty-year period beginning in 1897, the
Supreme Court frequently relied on the notion of substantive due process arising
from the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate various state measures affecting
economic freedom. 24 This era is typified by the Court's decision in Lochner v. New
York, 25 in which the Court struck down a state measure that limited the hours a
Id. at 130.
"1 Id. at 130-31. See also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (holding "where an owner
possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking
because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety").
120 See supra text accompanying note 93.
12 Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
122 Id. at 176.
123 See Freitag, supra note 105, at 745. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, asserted that "[elven
more consequential than its incorrect disposition of this case, however, is the Court's resurrection of
a species of substantive due process analysis that it firmly rejected decades ago." Dolan, 114 S. Ct.
at 2326 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.3 (4th ed. 1991).
125 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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bakery employee could work. 26 In Lochner and other decisions of this era, the
Court extended almost no deference to state legislatures and instead determined on
its own whether the law in question was a proper use of a state's police powers. 127
The reach of the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence extended into the
realm of land-use regulations as well. In Nectow v. City of Cambridge,2 the Court
struck down a zoning ordinance limiting a portion of the plaintiffs land to
residential property because the ordinance did not promote the general welfare of
the city. 29
The Court's aggressive use of substantive due process began to decline
when Congress started enacting various New Deal legislative measures to protect
the public welfare. 3 ' Most notably, in the 1938 decision of United States v.
Carolene Products Co., '3' the Court upheld a federal regulation proscribing the
interstate shipment of milk that contained non-milk fat additives. The Court
explicitly deferred to the discretion of Congress and held the "existence of facts
supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed for regulatory legislation..
. unless.., it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators."'' 33
Since 1938, the Court has applied a substantially reduced form of scrutiny to
regulations affecting economic freedom, essentially presuming the constitutionality
of such regulations. 34
By applying a heightened form of scrutiny to land-use regulations, the
Court has not revived the specter of Lochner. 35 Instead of questioning the power
of local legislatures to enact police power regulations, the Court presumes the
legitimacy of land-use regulations but ensures that individual property owners are
not deprived of their Fifth Amendment rights. In Nollan, the Court presumed the
California Coastal Commission's proposal that the public's ability to see the beach
is a legitimate governmental interest. 36 In fact, the Court affirmed that "a broad
126 Id. at 64.
127 See NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 124, § 11.3. For a discussion of the Lochner era and how the
courts viewed property rights during that era, see JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
LIMITs OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 128-31 (1990).
128 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
129 Id. at 188.
13' See ELY, supra note 27, at 119-34.
131 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
132 Id. at 154.
113 Id. at 152.
134 See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977) (holding that a state regulation was an "orderly
and rational legislative decision" and therefore not substantive due process violation); Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (upholding state law against substantive due process attack declaring that
Court would not second guess wisdom of legislature); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1955) (upholding state regulation governing opticians because legislature "might have concluded"
it was necessary in certain situations).
' Lochner, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16 No~lan, 483 U.S. at 835.
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range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfies these requirements. ' "'3
Likewise, in Dolan the Court acknowledged that the government has valid police
powers to regulate development in such a way as to prevent flooding and relieve
traffic congestion. M  Thus, the Supreme Court, in applying heightened scrutiny in
regulatory takings cases, is not conducting unwarranted judicial fact-finding and
second-guessing the legislature's purpose as the Court did in the Lochner era.
Instead, the Court is simply ensuring that property owners receive the full panoply
of rights guaranteed them by the Fifth Amendment.
D. The Need for Heightened Scrutiny
Will the Court's invocation of heightened scrutiny in reviewing land-use
regulations have a devastating effect on local governments' ability to carry out their
role as guardians of the public welfare? As a result of growing urban populations
and increasing environmental concerns, local governments are resorting more
frequently to land-use regulations and developmental exactions as a feasible way
to implement various land-use planning strategies. 3 1 In response to Dolan, some
commentators have expressed concern that local governments will no longer be able
to implement land-use regulations without violating the Takings Clause and,
because of financial difficulties, will not be able to condemn land in exchange for
just compensation. Joseph M. Manko, a Delaware county commissioner and land-
use attorney, warns that "the Supreme Court's retrenchment of private property
rights, combined with the downturned economy, may force cities and towns to
endure greater hardships to reap the fruits of growth."' 40
In Dolan, the Court conceded that the exactions represented a sound
method of preventing flooding and relieving traffic congestion.' The Court,
however, correctly refused to defer entirely to the legislature and relax its judicial
scrutiny, a solution to which courts too often resort after acknowledging that the
regulation will result in a public benefit. 42 If the Court had simply required that
'1 Id. at 834-35.
138 See supra text accompanying notes 71-73.
139 See, e.g., Page C. Dringman, Comment, Regulatory Takings: The Search for a Definitive Standard,
55 MONT. L. REV. 245, 246 (1994).
140 Joseph M. Manko, Decision May Give Builders Upper Hand, PHILA. INQ., Aug. 14, 1994, at 3.
See also, Jessica Mathews, Takings Exception, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1994, at Al 6 (alleging that
takings movement is "shortsighted, dangerous, backdoor attack on the means that allow us as
neighbors, towns, states or a nation to live and compete in reasonable harmony").
141 See supra text accompanying note 71.
142 See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Hempstead 369 U.S. 590 (1962). The Goldblatt quarry was a typical quarry
with a deep pool of water at the bottom. Id. at 591. The local government prohibited Goldblatt from
conducting any further quarrying, purportedly to prevent children from drowning in the deep water.
Id. at 592, 595. Despite the fact that the regulation probably would have little impact on the number
of drownings in the quarry, and despite the fact that there were a variety of alternative solutions that
the local government could have required, such as a fence, the Supreme Court relinquished its inquiry
after deferring to the local government's determination that prohibiting future quarrying was a rational
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the city's exactions have an essential nexus to the city's purported interest in
preventing flooding and traffic congestion, the Court would have yielded too much
deference to the legislature without providing adequate protection to Dolan. For
instance, if the Court had stopped at its finding of an essential nexus and did not
inquire into the extent of the exaction, the city could demand a thirty foot wide bike
path and twenty percent of the land for a stormwater drainage area, and the Court
would not have found a taking.'43 There would have been no taking because there
would have been an essential nexus between the exaction and the city's interests in
preventing flooding and traffic congestion.'
Instead, the Court's "rough proportionality" standard demands that courts
examine regulations to ensure that a government is not imposing arbitrary
regulations which generally benefit the public. 45 In Dolan, the city argued that the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway "could offset some of the traffic demand on [nearby]
streets and lessen the increase in traffic congestion."'46 The Court was not satisfied
with the city's finding that the construction of the bicycle/pedestrian pathway
"could" alleviate any additional traffic congestion that the development might
cause. 47 The Court held that the city must conduct adequate studies to demonstrate
that the proposed development warranted a new pathway. 48
The Court was even more circumspect with regard to the city's demand that
Dolan turn over ten percent of her property so that the city could maintain a
greenway for better stormwater drainage. 149 Once again, the Court noted that a
greenway is generally a valid exaction in an effort to prevent flooding, but the Court
was not convinced that Dolan should give the land to the city so that the city could
maintain it as a greenway. 50 The city did not demonstrate any reasons as to why
a public greenway was needed to prevent flooding rather than a private one owned
by Dolan. 5'
The Court's newly articulated "rough proportionality" standard, and the
Court's placement of the burden of proof upon local governments, ensures that
solution. Id. at 595-96. See also POLLOT, supra note 34, at 69. Professor Pollot observes that
regulations are often supported by legislative claims that the regulations are immediately necessary
to protect the public. Id. He admonishes that, "at just such times, public passions-against which the
Framers attempted to construct a barrier-are at their highest." Id.
143 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318-19.
144 Id.
141 See id. at 2319 (citing Simpson v. North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Neb. 1980)).
146 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315 (quoting city's petition for certiorari).
141 Id. at 2321-22.
148 The Court specifically held that "[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city
must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle
pathway beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand generated."
Id. at 2322.
149 See supra text accompanying note 84.
IS0 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320-21.
151 Id.
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property rights will not expand and contract with the caprice of the legislature. 2
Courts must heed Madison's premonition that, if left in the hands of the legislature,
property rights will not be adequately secure."' If legislatures go unchecked, land-
use regulations, especially in the form of developmental exactions, will force
individual property owners to bear the burden of the public. In Dolan, for instance,
the city's general land-use plan required developmental exactions for
bicycle/pedestrian pathways when development was to occur in an area that was
"located on a street with designated bikepaths or adjacent to a designated
greenway/open space/park."' 4 Through this provision, the City of Tigard required
private property owners to foot the bill for what amounted to a public easement.
Of course, such a pathway is beneficial and most likely very popular with the
public, but it is not likely to be fair to private landowners. The Supreme Court has
observed that a fundamental purpose of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.""' Likewise, the greenway
demanded by the city was justified as a protection against the risk of flooding. 6
The city, however, could have devised a solution more narrowly tailored to
preventing flooding rather than requiring Dolan to give a portion of her land to the
city to maintain as a greenway. 7 The more legislative justifications are allowed
without judicial scrutiny, the more the rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment
are abandoned.
According to Justice Stevens, the Court should consider how the totality
of an owner's property rights are affected by the exactions and what benefits the
owner would receive as a result of the development permit.'58 He noted that a better
stormwater drainage system would benefit Dolan and the other property owners
abutting the creek.'59 The benefit of increasing the commercial potential of the
property as a result of the city granting the permit, according to Justice Stevens,
"52 Madison noted that "[tIhe sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has
directed the public councils." THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 288 (James Madison) (Issac Kramnick ed.,
1987).
I Madison warned that legislative abridgements of property rights brought "into question the
fundamental principle of republican Government, that the majority who rule in such governments are
the safest Guardians both of the Public Good and private rights." James Madison, Vices of the
Political System of the United States (April 1787), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER, supra
note 89, at 62.
154 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313 n.l (quoting the City of Tigard's Community Development Code, §
18.86040.A.l.b). The Supreme Court did not pass on the constitutionality of the city's general land
use regulations and their variance provisions themselves. Id. at 2316 n.4.
"I Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); see also Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 ("[A]
strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by
a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.").
156 Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318.
157 See id. at 2320-21.
I Id. at 2324 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159 Id.
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more than offset the fact that Dolan would lose a portion of her property.'6 ° Not
only does this view contradict Justice Holmes' definition of regulatory takings in
Mahon,'61 but it condones the fact that Dolan would then unfairly shoulder the cost
of public benefits without just compensation.
IV. REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN: WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
[Tjhe ends no longer justify the means in the regulation of land use. '62
The good news is the [Clourt's explicit recognition that land use can and should
be regulated '63
The Court's continued willingness to apply heightened scrutiny to land-use
regulations will certainly have an impact on regulatory takings jurisprudence, and,
as succinctly put by Justice Stevens, Dolan is "unquestionably an important
case.''" The Court has made it clear that the Fifth Amendment protects the rights
of property owners from unwarranted governmental intrusions.
But how significant will the Court's attempt to strengthen property rights
be? In certain aspects, the Court's heightened scrutiny standard is not completely
clear, and commentators have expressed concern that regulatory takings
jurisprudence is still muddled.'65 In fact, since Nollan and Lucas, many state courts
have ignored or misinterpreted the Supreme Court's restoration of property rights.' 66
Although Dolan provides a sensible approach to restoring Madisonian
property rights, the Court has failed to provide adequate guidance, leaving the
practical effect of Dolan questionable. In response, Congress as well as many state
legislatures have proposed a variety of measures attempting to restore property
rights without resorting to the courts. 67 Many of these measures diverge from the
Madisonian concept of property rights because they would thwart valid land-use
160 Id. at 2325-26. Justice Stevens went as far to presume that "the duty to pay taxes and the
responsibility for potential tort liability may well make ownership of the fee interest in useless land
a liability rather than an asset." Id. at 2326. This position illustrates the trap about which Justice
Holmes warned when he said, "When this seemingly absolute [property rights] protection is found to
be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification
more and more until at last private property disappears." Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
161 See POLLOT, supra note 34, at 92-94. Professor Pollot observes that Holmes required just
compensation when any interest is taken from a property owner, regardless of the interests that were
not taken from the property owner. Id.
6 Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Gives Developers Crucial Victory: They Are Freed from Many
Local Environmental, Public Use Rules, SAN FRAN. CHRON., June 25, 1994, at Al.
16 Laurie Asseo, High Court Ruling Favors Landowners: Governments Must Prove Regulations Are
Valid, BOST. GLOBE, June 25, 1994, at 3.
" Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165 See supra text accompanying notes 162-63.
'6 See supra notes 163-65 and infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
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regulations. 6 This section discusses some of the remaining problems in the takings
arena and some of the proposed remedies and concludes with suggestions for
improving the protection of property rights while facilitating valid land-use
regulations.
A. The Impact of Heightened Scrutiny in Land- Use Regulations
Some lower courts have heeded the Supreme Court's decree that property
rights are to be afforded greater protection through increased judicial scrutiny.'69
Commentators point out that many lower courts, however, are not abiding by the
Supreme Court's recent decisions concerning regulatory takings. 70 Professor
Williams has suggested that lower courts are either directly evading Supreme Court
policy in the area of regulatory taking, or simply ignoring the Court's rulings.'7'
Indeed, in Trimen Development Co. v. King County,'72 the Washington Supreme
Court upheld park development fees against a takings challenge. The court cited
the "rough proportionality" standard of Dolan and interpreted it to require that the
development exactions be only "reasonably necessary" as a result of the landowners
proposed development.'73 When lower courts fail to apply the increased scrutiny
demanded by the Dolan, the legislative machinations that Madison feared
materialize.'74
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City'75 provides a more startling example of
legislative intrusion into the rights of property owners despite the Supreme Court's
explicit proscription of such. A California developer, Richard Ehrlich, purchased
a vacant lot upon which a private tennis club formerly existed.'76 When Ehrlich
proposed to build thirty townhouses on the site, the city imposed a $280,000
"mitigation fee" for the loss of recreational facilities, plus a $33,220 "in lieu art
fee."' 77 The city reasoned that, because townhouses would be constructed where
a tennis facility previously existed, the mitigation fee was necessary for the city to
provide comparable public recreational facilities elsewhere. 7 ' Moreover, the "in
.6 See infra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
169 See, e.g., Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding taking
when Corps of Engineers prohibited landowner from constructing on wetlands because prohibition was
not sufficiently related to government interests and denied owner economically beneficial use of land);
Petermann v. Department of Natural Resources, 521 N.W.2d 499 (Mich. 1994) (finding taking because
government did not meet Supreme Court's essential nexus and rough proportionality tests).
170 See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PLANNERS, LAND USE AND THE CONSTrrUTION: PRINCIPLES
FOR PLANNING PRACTICE 91-93 (Brian W. Blaesser & Alan C. Weinstein eds., 1989).
"' Id. at 92.
172 877 P.2d 187 (Wash. 1994).
113 Id. at 194.
114 See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
' 15 Cal. App. 4th 1737 (1993), vacated 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
176 Id. at 1742-43.
17 Id. at 1743.
178 Id. at 1744.
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lieu art fee" was necessary because the townhouses diminished "the opportunity for
creation of cultural and artistic resources."' 79 Ehrlich argued that the exactions
constituted a taking because they did not meet the nexus test of Nollan.80 The
California Court of Appeals ruled that the nexus test did not apply because the city
was not demanding property from the landowner, only a fee.'' According to the
court, even if the heightened scrutiny of Nollan did apply, the exactions satisfied
the test because there was a substantial nexus between the land-use restriction and
the condition of approval." 2 In 1994, the Supreme Court, relying on Dolan, vacated
and remanded the Ehrlich opinion." 3 Once again, the California court ignored the
decree of the U.S. Supreme Court, ruling that the city's exactions met the rough
proportionality test of Dolan. '"Not surprisingly, the court ordered that its opinion
not be published. 5
B. Legislative Attempts to Ensure Adequate Protection of Property Rights
Even in light of the Supreme Court's clear intent to restore property rights
to the level envisioned by Madison, throughout the past few years federal and state
legislators have proposed various bills to address takings issues.'86 These bills fall
under one of two general categories. First, there are bills that would require the
government to compensate private property owners when land-use regulation
devalues their property by a specified percentage.'87 The second category
comprises bills that would require government agencies to conduct a "takings
analysis" before enacting any regulations affecting land use. 8 Neither of these two
solutions provides a viable method to ensure appropriate property rights protection
while allowing for necessary land-use regulation.
In 1995, the House of Representatives passed a bill sponsored by
Representative Charles Canady that would require the federal government to
79 Id. at 1755.
Io Id. at 1747. For a discussion of the nexus test, see supra text accompanying notes 47-55.
" The court held that monetary exactions must only be rationally related to legitimate governmental
interests. Ehrlich, 15 Cal. App. 4th at 1749.
182 Id.
"s 114 S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
,84 See Gideon Kanner, Rule of Law: In California, a Land Owner Loses Again, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8,
1995, at Al5.
"I Id.
' Many lawmakers believe that recent Supreme Court rulings are too narrow on the takings issue and
thus do not provide adequate property rights protection. See Takings: State Legislators Adopt
Resolution Opposing Federal Laws to Define Takings, 144 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) d8 (July 29,
1994). Legislators frequently cite the increasing number of intrusive government regulations,
especially environmental regulations, as the impetus for proposing bills that would provide greater
property rights. See General Policy: 'Contract' Takings Provision Would Lead to Corporate
'Windfalls,' Official Says, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2006 (Feb. 17, 1995).
'" See infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 192-96 and accompanying text.
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compensate landowners if federal regulations devalue their property by more than
twenty percent.s Such bills would essentially render the federal government's
police powers ineffective to enact valid land-use regulations. Choosing an arbitrary
diminution-in-value amount which would trigger just compensation, would thwart
regulations necessary to protect the pubic health, safety, and welfare. For instance,
if the federal government forbade an industrial company from destroying a natural
wetland and this lowered the company's return on investment by more than twenty
percent, the government would have to compensate the company. These bills
blatantly eviscerate the government's police powers in the name of property rights
protection.
Legislators, environmental groups, and others have mounted a fierce
opposition to these legislative proposals. United States Associate Attorney General
John Schmidt described the takings proposals as "a blunderbuss approach that
would provide unjust windfalls to wealthy corporations at a tremendous cost to the
health, safety, and pocketbooks of middle-class Americans."' With a substantial
deficit weighing down the federal government, it is unreasonable to suggest that
governmental bodies can compensate landowners for regulations regardless of
whether the regulations are necessary to protect the public welfare.' 9' Although the
Fifth Amendment demands that the rights of property owners be shielded from
unnecessary government intrusion, as the Supreme Court has ruled, government
must still maintain the power to enact necessary land-use restrictions to protect the
public welfare.
Other property rights bills require government agencies to conduct
extensive analyses before enacting any land-use regulations. Senator Robert Dole
has proposed the Omnibus Property Rights Act of 199592 which requires federal
agencies to prepare an analysis detailing the purpose of the regulation, assessing
the likelihood that a taking of property will occur under the regulation and the
amount of compensation that would result, and discussing alternatives to the
regulation. 93 Many state legislators have proposed similar bills which would apply
to state agency regulations. 94 At first glance, these proposals appear to constitute
"19 H.R. 925, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1995).
"9 Property Rights: Takings Provision Under 'Contract'Draws Fire from Government Officials, 29
Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) dl I (Feb. 13, 1995).
191 Justice Holmes asserted that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law."
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
192 S. REP. No. 22, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
'91 S. REP. No. 605, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). This bill also proposes that the federal government
be required to compensate property owners when federal regulation devalues their property by more
than 33%. Id.
194 See, e.g., H.R. 2220, 42d Leg., 1st Sess. (Ariz. 1995) (providing that owner of private property can
be compensated for state action reducing value of property); S. 747, 1995 Sess. (Cal. 1995) (requiring
compensation whenever implementation of state regulatory program denies permitted property use);
H.R. 801, 18th Leg., 1995 Sess. (Haw. 1995) (establishing guidelines for agency actions relating to
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a reasonable stop-and-think approach to adequately ensure that government does
not make unnecessary intrusions upon private property. However, the time and cost
constraints of agency actions render such analyses infeasible. Neither federal nor
state agencies have the resources to prepare extensive studies for every land-use
regulation considered by a federal agency or local governing board. Some
commentators suggest that this "look before you leap" approach will not be overly
burdensome but will simply require government agencies to be more careful in
enacting regulations. 195 Others rebut this argument by pointing out that agencies
already conduct scientific studies before enacting regulations and that imposing
formal bureaucratic requirements would cost millions of dollars in staff time in the
states alone. 196
In the past, takings issues have been left to the jurisdiction of the courts,197
and any future interpretation of the takings clause should remain in the courts. The
takings question is fundamentally one of constitutional interpretation, and the
judicial system is the appropriate forum for providing solutions to private property
disputes. To ensure the Madisonian balance of protecting property rights while
allowing government to exercise adequately its police powers, takings issues must
be decided on a case-by-case basis. Only in that manner can a judicial body take
into account the individual circumstances, including: (1) the economic impact on
an affected property owner, (2) the public purpose for which a particular land-use
regulation was adopted, and (3) the nature of the government action.
C. State Courts Should Implement Both Substantive and Procedural Changes to
Improve Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
Most cases involving land-use regulations are heard by state courts, and
thus the improvement of regulatory takings jurisprudence must begin at the state
court level.'98 The lack of a cohesive and comprehensible takings standard has lead
land-use regulations that may constitute taking); S. 2117, 1995 Sess. (Miss. 1995) (providing remedy
for owners of property value of which has been diminished by implementation of governmental
regulatory programs); H.R. 311, 54th Leg. Sess. (Mont. 1995) (requiring review and assessment of
proposed state actions that might result in depriving property owner of economic value of private
property); H.R. 2504, 68th Leg. Sess. (Or. 1995) (requiring regulating entities to pay compensation
for certain types of regulation affecting private property); S. 374, 1995 Sess. (S.C. 1995) (providing
compensation under certain conditions as result of state regulations that substantially interfere with
private property); S. 55, 1995 Sess. (Vt. 1995) (requiring compensation to property owners whenever
regulations reduce value of property to less than 50% of its value).
'95 See Regulatory Reform: Moratorium Bills Take 'Meat Axe'Approach to Regulations, Chafee Says,
39 Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) d18 (Feb. 28, 1995).
"9 See White House Seeks to Mitigate Effect offHill's 'Regulatory Relief Agenda, 91 Daily Env't Rep.
(BNA) dIS (May 13, 1994).
' See supra notes 22-55 and accompanying text.
198 In Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985),
the Supreme Court held that property owners cannot bring a claim under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment until they have exhausted available state remedies. This is typically referred to as
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to confused jurisprudence and inefficient land-use policy making.'" When state
courts refuse to apply heightened scrutiny to questioned land-use decisions,
property owners cannot feel secure that their rights will not be subject to the caprice
of government. By applying heightened scrutiny, state courts will force local
governments to tailor land-use regulations so that infringements of private property
will be minimized to only those necessary to promote the public welfare.2"
William H. Hussmann, a Maryland county planning board chairman, summed it up
when he observed that Dolan "will probably cause us to be more concerned about
the reasonableness of what we're requiring [property owners] to do." 0' 1
In addition to espousing the substantive standards established by the
Supreme Court, state courts should implement procedural measures that will allow
for quicker resolution of regulatory takings disputes. For both property owners and
local governments alike, drawn out court proceedings result in increased losses and
costs."' While a property owner awaits a court's decision, development may be
halted, rents may go uncollected, and litigation fees abound.
Time also can mean money for government entities facing potential liability
to compensate the injured property owners for "temporary. takings." In First
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 3 the Supreme
Court held that an ordinance preventing the church from any development of its
land, even a temporary restriction, constituted a taking.2" More importantly, the
Court ruled that the state government must compensate the church for the entire
the "ripeness doctrine." See DAVID L. CALLIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS: ARE THERE ANY LEFT, in
REGULATORY TAKING: THE LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROLS 265-68 (G. Richard Hill ed., 1990)
[hereinafter REGULATORY TAKING].
" See discussion of Ehrlich, supra notes 175-85 and accompanying text. A telling illustration of the
inefficiency of local governments that have not carefully planned their land-use regulation strategies
involves the Lucas case, discussed supra text accompanying notes 43-46. The landowner in that case
purchased his property for $975,000, but the local government prohibited him from developing the
land. See John Gallagher, Laws of the Land in Property-Use Disputes, Judges Have Begun to Side
More Often With Landowners, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 18, 1994, at F6. After the Court ruled that
the land-use regulation constituted a taking, the local government paid the landowner $1.2 million in
damages. Id. Shortly after paying out the damages, the state sold the beachfront property to another
developer. Id.
200 For a synopsis of the current test that the Court employed in Dolan, see supra text accompanying
note 88.
2I Joan Biskupic, Justices Broaden Property Rights; Land Use Requirements May Be 'Takings',
WASH. POST, June 25, 1994, at Al. See also David G. Savage, Supreme Court Strengthens Rights of
Property Owners; Development, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 1994, at Al (reporting that number of legal
defenders of property rights believe that Dolan will affect those situations in which cities become
overzealous in their regulation).
202 See John Mixon, Compensation Claims Against Local Governments for Excessive Land-Use
Regulations: A Proposal for More Efficient State Level Adjudication, in REGULATORY TAKING, supra
note 198, at 307-22.
203 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
204 Id. at318.
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period that development was prohibited.2"' By imposing liability for temporary
takings, the Supreme Court has made it clear that government entities must be very
circumspect in enacting land-use regulation, or face potential liability even if the
government later decides to revoke the regulation upon complaint by the
landowner.2" If takings disputes are not resolved quickly, local governments may
forego enacting valid regulations for fear of triggering instant liability for prolonged
proceedings.2 7
To facilitate quicker resolution of takings disputes, state courts could
develop specialized courts to decide all land-use matters. Professor Mixon
advocates such a specialized judicial system and proposes that these courts could
employ trained investigators to conduct and manage preliminary matters to expedite
the entire process.20" If specialized land-use courts are not feasible, Mixon suggests
the use of a panel of traveling judges which could hear and decide land-use cases
quickly.2' Alternatively, states could establish administrative agencies to oversee
regulations affecting property owners. Through the use of trained and experienced
adjudicatory boards, agencies could expedite hearings and reduce costly delays.
By consistently applying the judicial standards delineated by the Supreme
Court in Dolan, state courts would enable both local governing boards and property
owners to better understand their respective rights to individual parcels of land.
This alone would likely reduce the quantity of litigation arising from land-use
regulations. Additionally, swift hearings and resolutions by adjudicatory boards or
specialized land-use courts would diminish potential economic losses by property
owners and would allow for local governments to provide integral land-use
management without heightened fear of liability for temporary takings as a result
of First Evangelical.
V. CONCLUSION
Freedom and property rights are inseparable, you cannot have one without the
other.21o
As a result of increasing population and greater environmental degradation,
increased land-use regulation has become inevitable. Accordingly, government
25 Id. at 322. It is important to note that the Court explicitly limited the results of First Evangelical
Church to the facts of that case. Id. at 321. That is, this case involved a regulation that deprived a
landowner of substantially all use of his property for a relatively long time (six years). The Court
noted that this ruling does not apply to "quite different questions that would arise in the case of normal
delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like." Id.
206 See id.
207 Takings litigation may drag on for many years. In First Evangelical, the ordinance in question was
first adopted in 1979, but the case was not decided by the Supreme Court until 1987. Id. at 307.
20 Mixon, supra note 202, at 313.
209 Id.
2"0 George Washington, quoted in Dringman, supra note 139, at 245.
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entities must utilize their police powers to protect the public welfare through
necessary land-use regulation. It is crucial, however, for governments to recognize
that the furtherance of important public land-use goals is not inconsistent with the
full protection of property rights. Government entities must use their powers
creatively to tailor solutions to pressing environmental concerns while respecting
property rights just as they respect other fundamental rights.
It is tempting for lawmakers to use regulations to benefit segments of
society at the expense of private property owners. Bicycle paths, walkways, scenic
easements, and greenways all benefit the public at large and are typically easy for
local governments to justify. Yet, the property rights of the landowners who are
forced to donate their land for the sake of the public are as important as the other
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. If the courts fail to protect these
rights, then property ownership is dictated by the whims of legislative sufferance.
In recent cases such as Nollan and Dolan, the Supreme Court has delineated
a judicial policy that recognizes the necessity for a broad range of governmental
police powers while simultaneously preserving the property rights which James
Madison and the founding fathers sought to protect. Yet regulatory takings
jurisprudence remains obscure because state courts have not uniformly interpreted
the Supreme Court's rulings or have simply failed to adhere to the rulings.
Furthermore, takings jurisprudence does not lend itself to bright-line legislative
solutions which do not adequately balance the competing interests of land-use
regulations and the constitutional rights of private property owners. State courts
must espouse the Supreme Court's latest ruling in Dolan so as to allow for the
proper balance of government police powers and private property rights.
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